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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The Curse of Windfall Income: How Foreign Aid and Natural Resource Dependence
Constrains Growth
by
Adams Bailey Nager
Master of Political Economy and Public Policy
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Norman Schofield, Chair

Literature exists on two ʻcurses,ʼ the natural resource curse and the curse of foreign aid,
which limit growth in developing nations. At their core, both the natural resources curse
and the curse of aid derive from the same root cause- the curse of windfall income. The
windfall curse is a macroeconomic side-effect that negates the positive effects of
unearned capital by raising domestic prices and lowering competitiveness. While
windfall income creates growth in a countries service sector, it represses growth in the
manufacturing sector. These trends help explain the inability of both foreign aid and
natural resources to fuel sustained growth in windfall income-dependent economies.

vi

Introduction
#

Developing countries face a strange paradox. Natural resources, which would be

logically expected to provide capital for rapid economic expansion, frequently end up
doing more harm than good. This phenomenon, which has been examined extensively
by economists and political scientists, is commonly known as the resource curse.
#

The resource curse is not the only illness to affect developing economies.

Foreign aid can also paradoxically set a country back. Foreign aid displays many of the
same basic symptoms of the resource curse, including limited growth, incentives for
irresponsible political actions, and low competitiveness abroad. In fact, the two curses
are so similar that they should be considered the same affliction- the curse of reliance
on unearned capital to generate development, or the curse of windfall income. This
paper attempts to illustrate the similarities between the natural resource and foreign aid
curses, identify the driving mechanism behind the curse of windfall income, and
empirically demonstrates the dangers of the two curses and the similarities between
them.
#

In essence, both foreign aid and natural resources are gifts to a developing

economy. A natural resource gift derives from nature. A country that is endowed with
easily extracted minerals has a huge pool of potential income which they can choose
how quickly to use. The extraction process has very little interaction with the nonresource sector of the economy, especially in poor countries where almost all of the
skilled labor and capital needed for extraction comes from abroad. Developing countries
endowed with natural resources court international corporations, typically from either
China, Europe, or the United States, to provide this labor and capital.

1

#

Discovering and exploiting natural resources, such as oil, can generate incredible

amounts of income. Increasing production, however, typically results in stagnation or
contraction of non-resource export sectors. Natural resource exportation inflates a
nationʼs currency, making domestically produced goods less competitive in international
markets. This process is known as Dutch Disease.
#

Aid functions similarly. While oil and other resources can be classified as gifts

from nature, aid is a gift from first-world donors. Influx of government revenue is
expected to boost the performance of the economy. Much like oil, donated goods and
funds from abroad are not earned by an economy. Western donors either produce
goods and ship them to poor recipient nations or send money to furnish public goods.
While this encourages productivity in Western economies, it floods the recipient country
with goods that are essentially free. Inflows discourage manufacturing by negatively
affecting a countyʼs competitiveness. Effects on the countryʼs economy can be
significant.
#

Neither aid nor resource income are tied to an economyʼs productive capacity.

Rather, foreign aid and natural resource boons can be considered windfalls. In this
paper, I argue that both aid and resources are ʻcursedʼ because neither are earned.
Windfall income creates adverse macroeconomic effects that limit competitiveness.
Export-oriented non-resource sectors such as manufacturing shrink due to high
domestic prices and currency overvaluation, while non-tradable goods such as services
see steady growth fueled by an artificially large supply of domestic wealth.
#

In the remainder of this paper, I will define windfall income, review the literature

on the effects of both aid and resources on an economy, and argue why the curse of

2

foreign aid and the natural resource curse should be treated as the same disease. I
then analyze possible mechanisms by which windfall capital inhibits growth and identify
which mechanism fits the specifications that would define the curse of windfall income. I
test these theories empirically and then conclude.

Section I: The Curse of Windfall Income
#

Windfall income can be defined as income that does not derive from the efforts of

domestic labor, land, and capital. Most windfall income takes the form of either foreign
aid inflows or natural resource rents.1 For many resource economies, foreign companies
provide the capital and skilled labor to extract resources. Most inputs to the industry are
produced abroad, meaning that the resource sector has only a tangential relationship
with the remainder of the economy.2 Similarly, aid is frequently given either in the form
of internationally produced goods or in funds to provide localized services such as
health and education. These goods do not help productivity inside the recipient country,
but merely provide countries with more goods. Such aid can be instrumental in
providing much needed resources to the poor and in improving the standard of living but
do not, however, translate to a stronger or more productive export economy. Aid
strategies such as capital goods or expert consultants who work to increase domestic
productivity should not be grouped into this category, as this aid aims to increase
productivity within the country instead of merely providing goods.
1

Remittances also fit the characteristics of windfall income. However, remitted income is usually to small too factor
seriously into this discussion. Furthermore, they are not controlled by the government but by individuals, so
government incentives are not skewed by these transactions. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) dismiss economic
effects of remittances, saying that levels of remittances naturally decline when the exchange rate is overvalued.
Chistina Wood (2011) finds in her World Bank report on growth and jobs in MENA countries that oil sector was
major engine of growth in many countries, but growth resulted in negligible job creation.
2

3

#

The difference between earned and windfall income can be illustrated by

comparing the economies of Botswana and Angola, both of which are heavily
dependent on natural resources. When resource extraction requires significant
investment, infrastructure, and labor from within the country, these resource rents
cannot be considered windfalls but a product of a successful domestic enterprise.
Integration with the resource sector leads to more robust growth in the non-resource
sector which results in a more healthy, diverse economy. This is the case in Botswana,
where much of the economy revolves around mining diamonds. The mining industry is
highly reliant on local labor and investment to fuel production. Botswanaʼs economy has
grown steadily since 1980 and is one of the only nations in Africa that can truly be
considered a success story. While Botswana is still poor, has high income inequality,
and is overly reliant on its diamonds, it has experienced high rates of steady growth not
typically seen in countries reliant on resources.3 More importantly, despite high levels of
diamond production, the non-resource export sectors have not been seriously affected
by Dutch Disease.4 Former Botswana president Mogae stated: “For our people, every
diamond purchase represents food on the table; better living conditions; better
healthcare; safe drinking water; more roads to connect our remote communities and
much more.”5
#

Neighboring Angola is also highly reliant on natural resource income, yet non-

resource sectors are not nearly as involved in the production of resources as in

3

"CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Dec. 2011.
<cia.gov>.
4

Makochekanwa

5

Former President Mogae of Botswana, 7th June 2006, cited in Makochekanwa
4

Botswana. While diamonds in Botswana are an export, oil in Angola is a windfall. The
Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, both regulates and administers the oil industry.
The company relies on contracts with large multinational corporations to provide inputs
for extracting and delivering oil to market. To attain these valuable contracts,
multinationals pay large, undisclosed signing fees which enrich elites but are hidden
from citizens. Government income is used to subsidize specific goods produced by
fellow elites, creating a system of cronyism that benefits only a few.6
#

Resources from Botswana must be used in part to pay local laborers and support

domestic producers of inputs to the mining industry. Production of diamonds not only
generates income for elites but positively affects all levels of the economy. In Angola,
the profits of oil are controlled by the ruling elites, and the industry is shrouded in
secrecy. Most Angolans never experience benefits from the valuable resource that the
country controls.
#

Resources rents allow the government to maintain stable rule. Furthermore,

production efforts by poor Angolans are discouraged by the crippling effects of Dutch
Disease, which makes goods produced within the country less competitive compared to
foreign goods. The result is intense income inequality. Angolaʼs GDP per capita in 2011
was estimated at $5,090 in current US dollars, yet the top 10% of earners controlled
44.7% of the countryʼs income and 40.5% of the population lives below the poverty
line.7

6

Ramos, Angola’s Oil

7

"CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Dec. 2011.
<cia.gov>.
5

#

The differences between Botswana and Angola illustrate the difference between

earned and windfall income. In Botswana, the entire economy works towards diamond
production. Resource rents help develop Botswanaʼs economy across sectors and
income groups. In Angola, the average citizen has very little interaction with the oil
sector. Production is reliant on foreign capital and labor, not on local labor nor
domestically produced inputs, allowing the Angolan government to perpetuate an
autocratic system where elites claim most of the countryʼs wealth.

Effects of Windfall Income
#

It stands to reason that windfall income would supply a country with the tools to

develop and create economic growth. Both foreign aid and natural resources, however,
have systematically failed to produce positive economic effects. The curses also carry
negative political consequences. As Ross (1999) states: “Windfalls produce myopic
disorders among policymakers that can weaken state institutions that are necessary to
foster long-term economic development.”8 This prediction plays out in the literature, with
authors finding that both aid and oil leads to a decline in the quality of economic
institutions.
#

Numerous papers have demonstrated that no robust association exists between

aid and growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) is a pivotal work that shows that aid only
benefits an economy in the presence of good institutions. This reinforces the concept of
ʻSelectivity,ʼ which hypothesizes that windfall income can only help economies with
sound governance. Since then, a plethora of studies including Easterly (2003), Easterly,

8

Ross (1999). p308
6

Levine, and Roodman (2004), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Roodman (2004), and Rajan
and Subramanian (2005) find that even in countries with good policies, aid does not
cause growth. Additionally, natural resources have also been empirically shown to
generate unsubstantial growth.9#
#

Windfall income is also empirically shown to cause degradation of quality

governance. Excess income allows governments to exercise more control over
populations. Djankov and Montalvo (2008) empirically demonstrate that a 1% increase
in incoming Foreign Aid reduces a countryʼs score on a 10-point index of democracy by
between 0.6 and one point. The same paper found a .02 fall in the index for 1%
increase in oil rents. Djankov and Montalvo conclude bluntly, “Aid is a bigger curse than
oil.”10 Brautigam and Knack (2004) find that even when controlling for GDP per capita
and violence, aid has a significant, negative effect on democratic institutions.11
#

While the existing literature discusses the curse of aid and the natural resource

curse separately, the two curses are in essence very similar and should by all regards
be considered the same disease. Both have very similar effects in universally lowering
economic growth and contributing to deteriorating political institutions. Moreover, while
aid and resource income are realized in very different ways, they both supply large
amounts of unearned capital to governments.
#

To infer that the curses are identical, the underlying mechanism that causes

windfall income to constrain economic growth must be identified. If the mechanism is
9

See Gelb (1998)

10

Djankov and Montalvo (2008)

11

James Vreeland argues that aid is endogenous to failing regimes, as the countries that request funds
from the IMF and other institutions are the countries where the money is needed for elites to stay in
power, creating a selection bias.
7

identical for both aid and natural resources, it can be inferred that the two curses are
actually the same curse: the curse of windfall income. Such a conclusion could radically
alter approaches to the study of both foreign aid and natural resources and their effects
on growth.

SECTION II: Identifying a Mechanism
#

The question being asked is very specific. There is a mechanism sparked by

windfall income that serves to ubiquitously prevent growth in a diverse set of
economies. The mechanism increases in severity as windfall income becomes a more
substantial component of a countryʼs income. Furthermore, the effects are not closely
tied to variation in factors exogenous to the level of windfall income like institutional
quality. The mechanism should have comparable effects for both foreign aid and natural
resources. Finally, the mechanism should center around a negative consequence of
windfall income, not just one that negates a portion of the benefits.
#

Conceptually, windfall income could negate growth in two ways. First, windfall

income could be the equivalent of a sugar pill- a treatment that has absolutely no effect
on the outcome. It is hard to argue, however, that excess capital has no benefits.
Excess capital can be used to procure public goods, increase economic activity, invest
in industry, and provide welfare for the poor. Even where inflows are primarily
dominated by elites, benefits should trickle down to the nationʼs poorest and elicit at
least a marginal effect.
#

The second explanation is that windfall income, while helpful, has a deleterious

side effect that negates any benefit the initial treatment might have. This is a much more

8

feasible solution. While there are obvious benefits to what is essentially receiving free
money, there is a roughly equal but opposite effect that eliminates the benefits of
windfall income.
#

In the next section, I examine two classes of mechanism that could cause a

negative externality substantial enough to negate growth. The first derives from
distortions to political incentives caused by capital that does not derive from the labors
of the governed. The second class of mechanisms are economic. Excess capital from
outside the economy can heavily skew the internal economy through Dutch Disease,
which makes domestic manufactures less competitive compared to goods produced
abroad. I describe the effects that these two mechanisms could have on economies,
then analyze which phenomenon is more robust in its ability to constrain growth in
nations dependent on windfall income in a manner that matches the observed effects of
both the resource curse and the curse of aid.

Unknowns
!

It could also be argued that foreign aid and natural resources could potentially be

harmful through unknowns. Fluctuations of world resources prices and variation in aid
donations from first-world nations means that a country dependent on either aid or
resources cannot ever be fully confident about the value of inflows in the next period.
While this effect is heavily discussed in the literature, the overall effects are not
substantial and I reject them as a possible cause of the curse of windfall income.
#

Poor countries dependent on aid are at the whims of foreign donors. If first-world

economies decide not to provide as much aid, government budgets and consequently

9

the public goods they fund can fluctuate wildly. Additionally, the unknown quantity of
foreign aid can produce a moral hazard effect. Donors give primarily based on need, so
if a country digs itself into a hole it can credibly count on foreign donors for assistance.
An understanding that spending in the present period will not seriously constrain
spending in the future compromises incentives to use money responsibly.
#

The first component of the resource curse is vulnerability to market fluctuations.

Every country engaging in international trade is vulnerable to changes in supply and
demand to some degree. Countries that rely heavily on one commodity for export are
markedly more vulnerable. Fluctuations in markets can drastically raise or lower a
countryʼs income with little notice, which can be extremely disruptive.
#

In the late 20th century, oil prices were highly unstable. From 1970 to 1980, oil

prices shot up from less than $15/barrel to over $65/barrel. Ten years later prices had
fallen back down to 1970 levels. Countries dependent on oil were frequently unable to
pay for half-finished projects or public goods due to plummeting oil prices. Many
accrued severe debt. On the other hand, when oil prices are on the rise, unexpected
excess capital encourages wanton spending among top officials.12
!

Effects caused by unknown future prices and donation levels, however, are not

strong enough to provide a feasible explanation for the failures of natural resources and
foreign aid to increase growth. At most, these mechanisms are capable only of
lessening positive effects caused by windfall incomes. They could by no means act as a
viable externality capable of rendering windfall income ineffective. Thus, despite

12

“History of crude oil prices." Illinois Oil and Gas Association. Web. 21 Dec. 2011. <http://www.ioga.com/Special/
crudeoil_Hist.htm >
10

unknowns receiving considerable attention in the literature, I choose to dismiss these
effects as unsubstantial and irrelevant.13

Section III: Political Effects
!

Windfall income usually passes through the hands of the government. In the

case of foreign aid, incoming aid flows often make up the majority of a governmentʼs
budget. In 1999, 17 countries in Sub Saharan Africa relied on aid for over 50% of
government expenditures (with 10 more over 25% reliant).14 Likewise, resource
production is heavily taxed. In many countries dependent on oil, the government
receives little revenue from anything other than the oil sector. Logically, windfall income
has the potential to significantly alter a governments behavior. Increased levels of
windfall income could potentially allow the state to increase control over citizens and
lead to the deterioration of government institutions. Alternatively, windfall income can
also destabilize nations and lead to internal conflicts. While specific distortions to the
system vary between foreign aid and natural resources, the underlying mechanisms are
similar. Both aid and oil can either increase or decrease the stability of a regime.

Political effects of Natural Resources
#

States built upon oil income, while frequently autocratic, are often quite stable.

Many oil-states show little variation over time on standard measures of democratization.
Natural resources can make substantial contributions to regime stability, which can
13

This conclusion mirrors evaluation by Ross (1999), which also dismisses the effects of unknowns and market
fluctuations as unrelated to the root causes of the resource curse.
14

Brautigum and Knack (2004), Table 1
11

provide a better habitat for economic prosperity. However, windfall income can also lead
stable regimes to solidify and become more autocratic.
#

A government that receives substantial income from natural resources can use

those resources to generate benefits for their citizens. Oil revenue allows the state to
lower taxes and improve the quality of public goods such as schools, hospitals, and
public works. The government can also spend the money to decrease unemployment
and keep people satisfied. Higher spending and lower taxes can appease groups who
might otherwise oppose or revolt against the state. Lower risk of revolt leads to
increased stability. This process is referred to as the Rentier effect.
#

Stability is also enhanced through Asset Specificity.15 Oil income is fixed and

immobile. If a successful revolt did occur, the current owners of resources would be
unlikely to retain ownership- resource assets would naturally be the first thing
redistributed should an overthrow of a government occur. Because of this, elites with
income tied to the resource sector have strong incentives to support the incumbent
regime and to invest in maintaining the status quo. This pattern of stability is very visible
in many oil economies. In Saudi Arabia, for example, Saudi elites are heavily invested in
the success of the state. However, such stalwart support has led to little pressure on
Saudi Arabia to reform policies or allow citizens increased freedoms. While Saudi Arabia
is stable, its stability has allowed it to pass religiously conservative policies that are
considered backwards in the west.
#

Alternatively, natural resource income can just as easily have a destabilizing

effect. The Rentier effect only appeases citizens when all citizens are receiving goods

15

Boix (2003)
12

and services from the government. If income is not distributed equitably, or if certain
groups feel like they are being excluded or not treated fairly, a Grievance effect occurs.
Frequently groups who feel unfairly excluded from enjoying natural resource wealth will
undertake armed conflict to try and take their fair share by force.16
#

Natural resources also means there is more value to ruling the country. While

risks facing potential rebels are high, so too is the reward of controlling billions of dollars
of resource wealth. Resource wealth does not depend on the overall prosperity of the
country. Where the value of controlling a non-resource economy could be substantially
diminished by a destructive civil war, instability and conflict does not decrease the value
of an oil-field. This makes insurgency a lucrative proposition in resource rich countries.
#

Rebels can also find allies in unlikely places. Because any owner of immobile

natural resources must live with whichever side wins a civil war, rebel factions can
garner funding by exploiting the owners of resources. Owners are pushed to hedge their
bets by supporting all factions in a civil war to ensure that they retain ownership after
the conflict concludes. If an owner refuses to pay, rebels can target immobile resource
production centers, sabotage productivity and cause extreme damage. Exploitation can
provide rebel groups with vital resources to carry on a crusade against the government.
#

Natural resources can either help a government maintain stability or provide

incentives to incite a rebellion. Which effect dominates depends heavily on the quality of
institutions within the state. Where institutions are weak and governments are corrupt or
ineffective, Grievance effects caused by dissatisfaction over the allocation of resource
rents supersede the positive Rentier effects. In relatively developed countries, civil wars

16

Morrison (2012)
13

will be harder to start and less likely to succeed. In underdeveloped countries where the
government has paid little attention to large components of the population, guerilla
warfare and the exploitation of resource owners is common and effective.

Aidʼs Effect on Stability
!

Like with natural resources, foreign aid inflows can have either a stabilizing or

destabilizing effect on governments. Many of the mechanisms by which stability or
instability are realized are identical to the mechanisms that exist in resource-rich states.
#

First, aid also triggers the Rentier and Grievance effect. Aid money can help

provide many basic public goods, including better public health initiatives, education,
and infrastructure. Spending, ideally focused on the neediest segments of the
population helps governments protect their people.
#

Aid also has the power to encourage countries to enact reforms that help

liberalize markets and improve a countryʼs economy. Often, organizations such as the
World Bank and the IMF offer aid to countries that is conditional on political and
economic reforms. Countries liberalize in order to meet criterion for valuable inflows of
aid. Furthermore, conditionality effects can provide disincentives against coups or
rebellions if donor countries can make credible commitments to cut off funding in the
event of a military take-over or a civil war.17
#

On the other hand, aid can create incentives that lead to poorer institutions and

instability. Like with natural resources, the Grievance effect can take hold when aid is
not spent well. Aid frequently distorts a governmentʼs spending through a moral hazard

17

See Dunning (2004)
14

effect. Governments can count on foreign donors to bail them out if they do not use
funds responsibly in the current period, creating incentives to use the money fecklessly
or for self-serving purposes. Moreover, by maintaining at least some amount of visible
poverty and hunger, a country can increase aid inflows in future periods. When this
happens a Grievance effect will occur. Misuse of funds, specifically those intended to
provide goods for subjugated or oppressed groups, provides a visible example of a
governmentʼs corruption, and can lead dissatisfied citizens to support an armed
rebellion against the government.
#

Governments themselves are not the only ones to be corrupted by incoming aid.

Militaries of recipient nations are tempted by large amounts of capital under government
control. To avoid coups, leaders of aid-dependent countries appease their militaries by
channeling large portions of aid into defense-related spending. In his book, The Bottom
Billion, Paul Collier estimates that 40% of military budgets in Africa are funded by
foreign aid.18 Coups in African economies are still frequent. When a coup occurs,
western powers too often continue aid transfers to the new government. Foreign aid is
seen as support for the new regime, and validates the coupʼs legitimacy on an
international stage.
#

Furthermore, the ability of aid conditionality to either exact policy change or to

discourage civil war is unclear. There are countless examples of countries repeatedly
promising to enact reforms in exchange for aid, only to renege on their commitment as
soon as the aid has been received. Likewise, civil wars or other conflicts tend to induce
more aid flow, not less. Donors react to human rights tragedies with large donations
18

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are failing and What Can Be Done about It. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2007. Print. p103
15

meant to ensure the well-being of those displaced by conflict. Montinola (2007) shows
that aid conditionality only works in countries where institutional quality is already high.
Thus, for the majority of aid recipients, conditionality has limited ability to encourage
good policies.
#

Like natural resources, high levels of foreign aid creates incentives for civil war.

More aid means more to fight over. Attempts by different groups to control incoming
resources results in bloody conflict. In other cases such as in Somalia, factions fighting
civil wars actively prolong a crisis to ensure the continued flow of disaster relief money
into the country.
#

An extensive literature exists on whether foreign aid promotes democracy or

gives stability to recipient governments. Like with natural resources, mechanisms for
aidʼs effects on stability hinge on the quality of institutions in the recipient country.
William Easterly proposes that institutional quality determines whether aid will cause
growth, referred to as ʻSelectivityʼ in the literature.19 Empirical results on selectivity are
mixed and inconclusive, as discussed previously.20

Perspectives on Political Effects
#

Levels of windfall income seem relatively well equipped to explain a lack of

positive political change. In the best case scenario, windfall income freezes institutions
in place by providing elites with incentives to keep the status quo. The only mechanism
discussed that could actually move governments toward improved policies is aid

19

Easterly (2002). Cartel of Good Intentions

20

Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2004), etc.
16

conditionality (which has a dubious empirical record at best). In the worst case, windfall
income either encourages a deterioration of political institutions or actively increases
incentives for civil war.
#

Windfall incomeʼs ability to move government policy farther towards autocracy is

disturbing. Windfalls enable the government to take away individual rights and take
increased control over the economy. Because windfall income is generated
independently of the welfare of citizens, governments can continue to receive funding
regardless of how citizens are treated. As such, rentier states face low social pressure
to reform economic policies.21 Given donorʼs lamentable inability to maintain credible
commitments to the conditionality of aid, repressive economic policies are unlikely to
decrease windfall income. Investments in regime stability are frequently not beneficial to
economic performance, with elites “jealously guarding the status quo instead of
promoting development.”22
#

Political effects, however, do not necessarily match the problem that the curse of

windfall income presents. While becoming more democratic is positively correlated with
economic growth, countries with non-democratic forms of governments are certainly
capable of economic growth, especially when endowed with large amounts of capital.
Given the variation of institutional quality among countries receiving windfall income,
significant variation in results would be expected based on institutions. Neither the
curses of aid nor resources, however, have relatively observable ʻSelectivityʼ associated
with growth failures, implying that the actual underlying cause of limited growth is not

21

Shambayati (1994)

22

Mahdavy (1970) p443
17

strongly associated with levels of political freedoms. Furthermore, if increased chances
of instability is the side-effect that constrains the benefits of windfall income, there
should be noticeable divides between states that experience civil war and those who do
not. This divide does not occur and controlling for violence does not negate results.
#

In addition, while the effects of aid and resources here are similar, they are not

homogenous. Aid and oil have comparable, but distinct, influences on political
incentives and outcomes. Given the similarity in the negative effects exhibited in both
economies reliant on aid and resources, a mechanism that affects both aid and oil in the
same way is necessary.
#

I conclude that while windfall income has significant effects on a governmentʼs

actions and policies, these distortions cannot adequately explain the curses of
resources and aid. The effects experienced by the two are too distinct and are reliant on
an external variable- institutional quality. Political and institutional effects, while
significant, are overstated in the literatures addressing both foreign aid and natural
resources.

Section IV: Economic Effects
!

Dutch Disease is a serious affliction for many oil economies. The disease has

two components. First, a focus on natural resources tends to draw labor and capital
away from the non-resource sectors, lowering productivity and competitiveness. This
effect is not seen in many developing economies that discover natural resources,
particularly oil, because in many cases foreign capital and labor almost exclusively
provides the inputs for resource extraction. Poor, developing nations have neither the
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educated labor force nor the capital to take on such projects. Even if they did they would
lack all important access to foreign markets. Nations contract foreign companies,
typically from the US, western Europe, or China, to extract the oil, then retain a sizable
portion of the profits through taxes. Therefore, for developing nations, I do not consider
this first aspect of Dutch Disease to be a serious economic malady.
#

The second symptom of Dutch Disease is a more serious threat to developing

nations. When countries export sizable quantities of resources, the value of their
currency appreciates on international markets. This makes international goods less
expensive compared to domestically produced goods, and makes domestically
produced exports less competitive on international markets.
#

Results of Dutch Disease in oil economies are readily observable. In many

economies dependent on oil, lavish projects and public works provide jobs to the public.
Leaders and elites amass huge fortunes which purchase expensive imports. Nonresource sectors are usually dominated by services, with wages reliant on the money
the elites have earned from exporting resources. What is lacking, however, are
domestic jobs producing basic manufactures or tradable agricultural products.
#

In an economy where Dutch Disease has significantly altered the value of the

stateʼs currency, domestically manufactured goods are no longer able to compete with
cheaper imports. The countryʼs economy has a comparative advantage of producing oil.
Because so little domestic labor goes into the production process, most workers are left
with few economically viable options other than providing non-exportable services to the
owners of resource wealth.
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#

Governments sometimes try to fight Dutch Disease by subsidizing production of

manufactures in order to make industries competitive. In Angola, these subsidies were
given to elites as a form of patronage, making a few specific industries competitive to
keep powerful individuals allied with the government. Venezuela adopted more
egalitarian policies to support infant industries, yet manufactures subsidized with oil
wealth still never became viable. The government ended up paying failing companies to
stay in business to prevent widespread unemployment.
#

Countries that grow on the back of natural resource frequently have a highly

unequal income distribution. Equatorial Guinea has seen impressive growth fueled by
increased oil production since 1993, with GDP/capita propelled to $36,600 in 2010 (the
highest in Sub-Saharan Africa).23 The wealth, however, reaches only the top tier of
society. In 2006, 77% of the population were living under the poverty line despite GDP
per capita levels above those in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.24 Similar
conditions are seen in resource-based economies across the world.
#

The effect of Dutch Disease is readily apparent in Gabon. The country of just

over a million people is one of Africaʼs top producers of oil. Libreville, Gabonʼs capital, is
a modern looking city with a thriving service sector and substantial levels of public
goods. The city is home to a host of French nationals who provide most of the skilled
labor and expertise in extracting and marketing oil. Shops in the city display an
impressive array of foreign luxury goods. In his book “Untapped: The Scramble for
Africaʼs Oil,” John Ghazvinian describes a grocery store in Libreville selling high quality
23
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foods, mostly imported from Europe. Strangely, the store sells no bananas- a staple of
local production before the oil boom. Today, bananas are no longer a profitable
enterprise in Gabon and domestically grown bananas are almost impossible to find in
the capital because of extreme currency appreciation. Instead, bananas are imported
from neighboring Cameroon while fruit is left rotting on trees in Gabonʼs interior. The
country currently imports approximately 60% of its food supply. Importing food has
detrimental effects on the poor in Gabon, many of whom relied on agriculture as their
primary source of income. While the rich collect rents from oil, the poor no longer have
the ability to scratch out even a meager income. While GDP per capita in the country
ranks at nearly $6,500, well above the average in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40% of Gabonʼs
citizens are unemployed and 66% live on less than one dollar a day.25

Economic effects of Foreign Aid
!

Oil and other natural resources can inflate currencies and hurt the non-resource

sectors of an economy. Foreign aid can also generate currency appreciation that has
detrimental effects similar to natural resources. The World Bank found that exchange
rates in African countries are overvalued, which appears to be a combination of
appreciation from resources and from aid flows.26 Currency appreciation can restrict
growth in manufacturing sectors, robbing the country of much needed employment
outside of the subsistence agriculture sector and making the country increasingly
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dependent on aid. Aid negatively affects the production of tradable goods in recipient
economies through two mechanisms: a substitution and a pricing effect.
#

A prototypical example of the substitution effect is Malawiʼs fledgeling textile

industry, a fast growing sector which was largely derailed by an influx of donations from
would-be-philanthropists in Northern Europe after trade liberalizations in 1994.
Scandinavian aid organizations have been shipping second-hand clothing to the
Southeast African countries of Malawi, Tanzania, and Mozambique under the banner of
foreign assistance. Donated articles of clothing are sold at rock bottom prices on street
corners all around Malawi. Low price clothing sold for a few cents has practically
monopolized the Malawian clothing market.
#

Malawians, however, are not in dire need of clothing. In fact, Malawi, like most

countries in the region, had a burgeoning textile industry that produced clothes at
reasonable prices and employed thousands. The influx of donated goods has
dominated the textile industry and driven domestic manufacturers out of business. An
estimated 40,000 Africans have lost their jobs due to low cost imports of textiles that the
citizens did not need.27

Pricing Effect of Foreign Aid
#

The substitution effect of incoming foreign aid is readily apparent. Not as

obvious, however, is the mechanism by which inflows of foreign aid unrelated to the
textile sector can still negatively affect the textile industryʼs productivity and
competitiveness. Macroeconomic effects related to incoming aid act like Dutch Disease,
27
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inflating the cost of domestic goods compared to international alternatives and
negatively affecting competitiveness.
#

To use an example, say that international donors funded the construction of a

school in Malawi. Aid dollars donated from abroad would be used to hire laborers and
purchase building materials. Once it was constructed, aid dollars would provide a wage
for teachers and purchase textbooks and other basic materials to cover operating costs.
On the surface, this allocation of aid resources seems only to have positive
consequences. Increased education serves as investment in human capital which can
improve productivity and strengthen democracy in future periods.
#

When many aid projects are aggregated together, however, the results are not as

innocuous. On the macro level, this type of spending can hurt domestic competitiveness
and destroy jobs in the manufacturing sector. Employment in the service sector
increases, but much of service sector wages originate with and depend on foreign aid.
As a result, aid spending on the aggregate makes a country less connected to the
global economy and increases reliance on aid inflows.
#

Several mechanisms contribute to the negative macroeconomic effects a school

can have on manufacturing and other export-oriented industries. First, building a school
will divert skilled labor away from the manufacturing industry. The construction of the
school will require an educated contractor and other skilled laborers to construct. Once
built, the school will employ teachers and administrators. The school has increased the
demand for skilled labor in the country. Higher demand translates to higher wages.
While this is a boon for skilled laborers, export industries are harmed because skilled
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laborers are diverted away from factories. To keep their workers, factories are forced to
pay higher wage- raising production costs and lowering competitiveness.
#

Skilled labor is not the only factor of production that will become more expensive.

To build a school, aid dollars will purchase building materials and other scarce domestic
products. Like with skilled labor, this raises domestic prices of scarce resources, forcing
up input costs for the manufacturers.
#

Finally, like with natural resources, foreign aid inflows alter a countryʼs current

account balance and artificially raise the costs of production. Foreign aid primarily
constitutes imports that a country does not pay for. Excess imports can skew a natural
current account balance, where exports are used to pay for imports. When this equation
changes and imports now exceed exports, exports behave as if they are more valuable
than they actually are. The set of exports are used to acquire an artificially large set of
imports.
#

The way this effect is manifested depends on the structure of a countryʼs

currency. In a fixed-exchange rate economy, the imbalance in the current account will
raise domestic prices of vital domestic goods through the mechanisms discussed
above. Rising domestic prices caused by the current account imbalance increase prices
on international markets and lower competitiveness.
#

Alternatively, in flexible exchange rate economies, aid inflows simply push up the

nominal exchange rate. A higher exchange rate makes domestically produced goods
more expensive compared to those produced abroad.
#

Several studies have attempted to tease out the effects of aid and natural

resources on currency rate overvaluation. The most successful is Rajan and
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Subramanian (2005), which calculates a currencyʼs overvaluation by comparing a
countryʼs per capita income level to its actual price level relative to the United
States.The paper finds that aid and currency overvaluation are positively correlated over
time. It also found that overvaluation caused non-export sectors and capital intensive
industries to grow much faster than export-oriented sectors of the economy. This is
exactly the result that the model predicts, and goes a long way towards convincingly
demonstrating that aid suffers from aggregate macroeconomic side-effects nearly
identical to Dutch Disease.

The Economic Solution
#

A macroeconomic solution fits the observed conditions that contribute to the

resource and aid curses. The negative externality of Dutch Disease has nearly identical
effects in both economies based on natural resources and those reliant on foreign aid.
Moreover, the negative side effect that causes a lack of growth is directly related to the
quantity of aid received. These effects on the macroeconomic level serve to negate the
positive gains associated with excess income.
#

Aid inducing Dutch Disease further solidifies the idea that foreign aid and natural

resource curses are identical at a fundamental level. Both curses are fundamentally
caused by macroeconomic repercussions derived from unearned income. While
adverse effects caused by unknowns and from distortions to political incentives have
the potential to limit the benefits derived from windfall income, ubiquitous economic
effects actively negate positive aspects of windfall income.
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Table 1.
Aspects of Oil
and Foreign Aid

In Weak States

In Strong States

Currency
Aid- appreciated currency,
Exchange Rates hurts local industry and
increases dependence
Oil- Dutch Disease

Aid- Governments able to
judge what aid is needed. Does
not increase dependence
Oil- Proper Monetary Policy
counters Dutch Disease

Money for
discretionary
Spending

Aid and Oil- allocations
generate Grievances among
those who are not reaping
the benefits of income

Aid and Oil- government
spending on public goods and
lower taxes appeases citizens
and interest groups

Incentives to
Rebel

Oil- Rebels can exploit
Oil- Asset Specificity raise
resource owners for funding incentives for elites to invest in
for revolts.
regime stability
Aid- Wars will provide inflows Aid- Conditionality promises to
of humanitarian aid, which eliminate inflows of aid, placing
can be controlled by rebel
a premium on stability
factions

Response to
Unknowns

Oil- resource prices fluctuate Oil- Governments act
on international markers
responsibly and hedge income
Aid- government budget
from booms to support the
relies on unpredictable donor economy when prices are low.
behavior in a certain year,
Aid- Governments avoid moral
Governments can fall into a hazard
moral hazard conundrum

Section V: Sector Growth Fluctuations
!

The economic-based mechanism theory presented above describes foreign aid

and natural resources as contributing to service sector growth while repressing the
manufacturing sector. Such a development path is out of sync with how countries have
traditionally developed. It bears questioning whether such a path is capable of
26

sustaining long-term growth. It is possible that windfall income artificially inflates the size
of the service sector, which will contract if windfall income is depleted.
#

Countries usually developed with traditional sector growth patterns. A country

begins with dependence almost exclusively on agriculture. As technology increases
productivity and incomes rise, demand for food is satiated and demand for industrial
goods go up. The countryʼs industrialization period begins. Industrialization lasts until
the populationʼs demands become less material, generating the need for services. As
the country continues to grow, services account for an ever growing portion of the
economy.28 Most developed countries have very large portions of their GDP derived
from services- in 2010, the United Statesʼs service sector accounts for 78% of its GDP.29

Figure 1: Traditional Development Path for an emerging economy 30
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#

In the modern era, many countries have eschewed the traditional growth

schema, skipped the manufacturing phase, and seen growth originate directly from the
service sector. Part of this trend can be pegged to the fact that new technology, such as
the internet, has allowed services which used to be non-tradable to be outsourced.
While answering phones or doing paperwork is a traditional service, countries such as
India are completing these tasks for foreigners. These services are essentially exports.
Similarly, increased levels of international tourism pad the pockets of many developing
countries. Tourist goods are considered services, yet the money spent on them comes
from abroad.31 This wave of export-oriented services mimics the manufacturing phase
and precipitates a second influx of more traditional, domestic-oriented services. This
resembles a traditional path of producing first then transitioning slowly to demanding
consumption of traditional services.
#

Service growth is fueled by windfall income. Foreign aid and oil dollars enable a

countryʼs service sector to grow without any previous growth in manufacturing. Windfalls
raise domestic prices and hurt competitiveness, leading to a decrease in an economyʼs
ability to produce tradable goods. Conversely, the inflow of money in the economy
raises the income of producers of non-tradable goods. In essence, inflowing windfall
income allows a poor country to mimic their more productive neighbors who have the
income to support higher levels of services.
#

The literature largely ignores the differences in sector growth among economies.

Divides are clearly visible, however, in todayʼs global economy. China and many other
East Asian developing economies have taken the more traditional approach, with
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manufacturing led growth leading the economyʼs transition. In many other emerging
economies, industry is not the driving force of development.

Is there a difference between service led and manufacturing led growth?
#

Prior to the current period, there are very few examples of countries developing

based on growth in the service sector. Whether or not service sector led growth is a
positive or a negative, the current trend is certainly unique.
#

In countries experiencing industrially led growth, reliance on manufactures can

lead to economies of scale which encourage mass production and lowers production
costs. For poor countries, inputs such as labor are relatively cheap, which gives a
comparative advantage on international markets. Because a country has the potential to
sell goods to the entire world, they can produce on a global scale.32 Services, on the
other hand, cannot in most cases achieve economies of scale and can only reach
limited domestic markets. Services can be seen as increasing standards of living, but in
most cases not creating the basis for future growth.
#

Both the service and industrial sectors have the potential to generate growth and

raise income. However, services, especially traditional services aimed for local
consumption, will not perpetuate long term growth.
#

It is possible that for firms to be competitive abroad with their manufactures, they

must first have certain prerequisites for production such as working utilities,
communication technology, and the ability to transport goods to markets. These
prerequisites may only be attainable via foreign assistance. Additionally, services such
32
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as education and public health institutions can raise the quality of labor in the
workforce. The existence of a solid service economy could lay the groundwork that
makes future industry possible. As the economy transitions and becomes less
dependent on windfall income, manufacturing slowly replaces services. This leads to
sustained growth, transposing onto a traditional growth path. Evidence of these adverse
conditions are reflected in Africaʼs low labor productivity rates, which are only around
half of what they are on average in East Asia.33 If windfall income can fix conditions that
trap poor economies, then growth in basic service sectors may be necessary for growth
in other sectors.
#

The trend towards services instead of manufactures could also derive from poor

governing institutions. Firms run into trouble when faced with overbearing government
regulations. Firms that produce either traditional services or manufactures for domestic
consumption often run unlicensed to avoid costly regulations. Schnieder, Buehn, and
Montenegro (2010) estimate that the unlicensed, or shadow, economy of Sub-Saharan
Africa could be as large as 38% of the regions total economy.34 35 This being said, when
asked to name their most substantial obstacle to doing business, African business
owners across the continent responded that their two biggest concerns were stable
supplies of electricity and access to finance, which polled at 41% and 30% respectively.
Governmental factors such as tax rates, crime, licensing, and political instability scored

33

Dinh and Clarke, Performance of Manufacturing Firms in Africa, p51

34

Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010)

35

Informal economies may be partially driven by the distribution and sale of donated foreign goods, such as with
textiles in Malawi.
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a combined 18%. The remaining 10% cited competition from the informal sector as the
most substantial barrier to business.36
#

While windfall income can develop a nationʼs service sector, many of those

services will stop being profitable should windfall income dwindle. This precipitates a
situation where windfall-dependent nations become dangerously reliant on either natural
resources or foreign aid, with an economy that threatens to collapse if windfalls are shut
off. Furthermore, if aid does discourage manufacturing, then donors can be seen as
unintentionally damaging the traditional engine for emerging economies. Rajan and
Subramanian state: “Manufacturing exports provided the vehicle for [a fast growing
economyʼs] growth take-off, so any adverse effects on such exports should prima facie
be a cause for concern about the effects of aid on growth.”37#
#

To disprove that the service sector can lead to sustained long-term growth is

beyond the scope of this paper. It is possible that basic services funded by windfall
income are essential for providing a country with the tools to extricate themselves from
a poverty trap. Conversely, one could also argue that manufacture-led growth would
have already laid the groundwork for sustained growth if windfall dollars had not raised
prices and lowered competitiveness. Instead, this paper seeks to identify and quantify
the relationship between windfall income and growth in specific sectors. The main
hypothesis tested is that both natural resources and foreign aid promote growth in the
service sector of an economy while repressing growth in the manufacturing sector.
Implications from such a finding could provide a solid answer for why aid and natural
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resources fail to facilitate growth. It could also impact future aid policy and inform efforts
to provide responsible assistance to less developed countries.

Section VI: Data Analysis
#

The effect of aid on the economy is tricky to measure. Several biases are present

in traditional attempts to quantify the effect. First, aid is frequently increased in times of
crisis. Much like how police officers are deployed to deal with increased crime levels,
aid could be endogenous with failure because donations occur precisely because the
country is in a political or economic crisis. Secondly, aid can be given not to boost
development but to reinforce an alliance. The top two recipients of American aid are
Egypt and Israel, neither of which need the aid for development purposes per se.
Finally, for the basic case of aid, there is not a control group for aid recipients. If I find
that countries receiving aid grow at a certain rate, there is little to suggest this rate is
divergent from the unobservable, untreated outcome. Such a test has no power to
estimate the effects of windfall income.
#

Additionally, the data does not always reflect the total damage to manufacturing

sectors from windfall income. Natural resources are frequently used to fund transfers
that boost other industries. Therefore some countries may have artificially created
manufacturing growth. The windfall income curse may actively skew the economy in an
unobservable fashion.38
#

My data breaks down an economy into broad sectors in order to be able to track

a nationʼs development path. I begin by trying to show the effects of aid and resources
38
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separately, to verify that each has a similar effect on the growth of economic sectors.
After, I combine both phenomena into one regression, using aid and resource levels and
fluctuations to try to predict the size of the manufacturing and service sectors and their
change over time.
#

These goals are in line with previous work by Rajan and Subramanian (2009),

who looked empirically at the effects of aid (and only aid) on economic sectors. While
Rajan and Subramanian found results that support the hypothesis that aid is correlated
with service sector growth while hurting competitiveness, their data only spans the
range of the early 1980ʼs to the late 1990ʼs. My data set adds data from 2000-2010, not
only adding more range to the study but including a period in which Sub-Saharan Africa
(the most aid-dependent region in the world) has actually seen significant levels of
growth and country stability absent from earlier decades. Regardless of previous
significance, new trends may have emerged in the last few years.
#

Rajan and Subramanian (2009) attempt to arrive at a conclusion that aid affects

exchange rates. They use data estimating an economyʼs departure from long-run PPP,
compiling estimates of prices inside countries and analyzing how they differ from
globally estimated prices. This requires differentiating between what is unfounded
appreciation and what is natural growth in prices induced by the Balassa-Samuelson
effect, which posits that real exchange rate grows with real income.39 Rajan and
Subramanian then control for multiple other policies besides foreign aid that could
possible affect exchange rates.
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#

While the approach used by Rajan and Subramanian (2009) yields results, their

research makes numerous assumptions. In this model, I present the correlation as a
much simpler trend: high levels of foreign aid and natural resources result in service
sector growth and manufacturing sector stagnation. To illustrate this trend, I employ
simple macroeconomic cross-country data to attempt to illustrate such a correlation.
While I sacrifice some power to make causal statements, my model is less convoluted
and more able to make a simple, concise demonstration of how windfall income affects
sector growth.
#

In Table 2, I show the effects of foreign aid on growth in the service and

manufacture sector. I define aid as based on the percentage of GNI, which makes
sense for the study because I am interested in the total amount of domestic income that
is attributed to aid. The aid statistic includes military aid, disaster relief, UN intervention
forces, and more traditional development assistance. I choose this measure because 1)
the data are more readily available across a broad spectrum of countries and time
periods and 2) every incoming dollar that boosts internal consumption can, according to
the logic presented in this paper, hurt competitiveness. The downside of this approach
is that this opens up the data to susceptibility to outliers. For instance, Liberia in 2010
received 127.5% of its GNI in total foreign aid. Iraq received 78.8% in 2005. Of these
two observations, Iraq can be easily dismissed because it was being occupied by
foreign troops at the time. Liberia in 2010, however, was enjoying significant economic
growth. The extreme number actually reflects how aid dependent Liberia was during this
period. Even if accurate, extreme observations present barriers to clean regression
results.
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#

In regressing manufacturing and service growth on aid, I am interested in two

distinct characteristics of aid: how much aid is the country receiving on average, and
whether or not the level of aid has increased or decreased. Theoretically, a country
which went from low levels of aid to high levels of aid would experience a decrease in
the manufacturing share of its income. However, a country which was already aid
dependent at the start of the sample and gradually became less dependent would be
expected to become comparably more competitive internationally in 2010 than in 1980,
leading to perhaps a larger manufacturing sector. If a country stays relatively constant in
its aid dependence, I would expect a relatively constant depressed level of
manufacturing.
#

This is complicated by the fact that in most developing economies, the share of

the economy devoted to agriculture declined significantly from 1980 to 2010. In a 50
country sample,40 agricultureʼs share of the economy in 2010 represented only 64.6% of
what it represented in 1980. Services have largely made up the difference, with the
average service sector increasing by 25.1%.41 Manufactures and resources have both
remained relatively constant (at 102.2% and 91.8% of 1980 levels respectively). With
constant aid, manufacturing and service sector growth may occur simultaneously as a
function of dwindling agricultural importance. Meanwhile, services are becoming
increasingly important, especially in nations that are experiencing the traditional
transition towards services after the industrial phase of development.
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The 50 developing countries with complete data, all of which are included in the regressions in Table 3
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Growth in services follows expected trends outlined by Figure 1, as the worldʼs aggregate demands for
foods and manufactured goods are relatively satiated and the globe is moving now towards higher
production of services.
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#

Unfortunately, the data that I am working with is far from perfect. After screening

for basic data inclusion and excluding countries that are either considered developed
(over $10,000 GDP per capita) or too small (under 700 km^2), the data set dwindles to
101 countries. Only 50 of these countries had all values for the size of four sectors,
Agriculture, Service, Manufacturing, and Resources, over the thirty year period.
#

However, even for the these countries the data is susceptible at best. The

measurement techniques of the data made available by the World Data bank splits the
economy into sectors and assigns each sector a percentage. These percentages,
unfortunately, seldom add to 100%. Sector data ranges from accounting for only 80% of
the economy to as much as 115%. Some of this variation is expected. Manufacturing is
a subset of Industry in the World DataBankʼs data, meaning that other industry such as
mining and construction are not included in the summation. However, observations
above 100% are completely unjustified. While I reject some of the most extreme
observations, I have no choice but to make due with the majority of the flawed data. I
am forced to assume that these errors are random and normally distributed across
countries, but that errors are consistent across time and within each country. If the
measurements are calculated erroneously but consistently, I am still able to compare
changes to the data over time. Most individual data I have examined in depth reveal
relatively smooth sector growth rates which indicates consistency among samples.
There is a overarching shift across time of percentage totals, with countries averaging

36

95.6% explained in 1980 but only 91.8% in 2010 (out of the 50 nations with all data for
sectors reported).42
#

Table 2 represents the correlation of average levels of resources as a percentage

of GDP and the average level of total Aid as a percentage of GNI, from 1980 to 2010,
with changes in both the the manufacturing and service sectors. The purpose of these is
to see how increasing levels of aid and resources affect the changing composition of its
economy.
#

The results show limited support for the theory that high levels of foreign aid can

shrink the manufacturing sector of an economy while expanding the service sector. In
the first regression of table 2, which regresses manufacturing growth on average aid
and the increase dummy, shows that almost no correlation exists between average
levels of aid and manufacturing growth. What is does indicate is that, with 95%
confidence, increasing levels of aid are correlated with decreasing levels of
manufacturing. The second regression tells a similar story with the service sector.
Average levels of aid are not significant- and in fact the sign of the average aid
coefficient is negative, which runs contrary to the expected results- but the regression
expects that countries with increasing levels of aid to experience 8.6 percentage points
more service sector growth than countries with decreasing levels. It should be noted
that these results are associated by a lower level of significance.
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Figure 2.

** The charts above shows sector growth for countries with significant reliance on either aid or natural
resource income. ʻ1ʼ refers to a country with an increasing level of Aid or Resource reliance. ʻ0ʼ indicates
a decreasing level of reliance

#

There are many other explanations besides the one outlined by this paper for

why these trends appear. The sample size used here is relatively small, with many aiddependent countries unused purely because of lack of data. Many of these countries
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have experienced significant political turbulence in the last 30 years that could explain
differences in growth. Furthermore, as discussed previously, there is reason to doubt
the integrity of the data presented and there are potentially important variables missing
from the regression. Reverse causality could also be driving results, with raising
manufacturing levels resulting in lower need for foreign assistance. This being said, the
results above suggest that the theory of aidʼs impact on sector growth is not empirically
unfounded, and deserves closer evaluation.
Table 2.
#
#
(Intercept)

Aid/Man#
Aid/Serv#
Oil/Man#
Oil/Serv
1.48
9.01
-4.63
19.31
(1.37)
(4.52)
(7.70)
(16.29)
AIDAVERAGE -0.03 #
-0.40
(0.11)
(0.35)
AIDINCREASE -4.34*
8.64
(1.77)
(5.52)
RESAVERAVE #
#
#
#
-0.03
-0.88
# #
(0.19)# #
(0.43)
oo$RINCR #
#
#
#
1.95 #
-5.69
##
#
#
#
#
(5.56) ##
(11.51)
__________________________________________________
R$^2$
0.23
0.08
0.04
0.29
Adj. R^2
0.17
0.02
-0.12
0.19
Num. obs.
30
36
15
17
#
#

In regressions 3 and 4 of table 3, which present resource driven sector growth,

results are not as forthcoming. The regressions indicate that high levels of natural
resources inflate the manufacturing sector of the economy while depressing the service
sector. Increasing levels of resource dependence act in the opposite direction. While the
results have no significant power in regression 3, they are strongly significant in
regression 4, with an R^2 value of 0.29. This result runs directly contrary to the theory
presented, which hypothesizes that higher natural resource levels will support a thriving
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service sector economy. However, with a sample size of only 17, and with the majority
of observations clustered near the origin, it is hard to justify interpreting these results as
accurate or significant in any way.
#

The data are flawed in another key way. While calculating the change in

manufacture percentages, great care was taken to make sure that the movement was
not directly correlated with movements of natural resources. Thus, manufacturing
growth is calculated based on the non-resource sectors of the economy. This prevents a
growth in resource wealth from indicating a decrease in all sectors despite none of the
other sectors being affected by the shock.
#

While this precaution ensures that the manufacturing growth variable is not

directly compromised by resource shifts, it does not help resources from being affected
by manufacturing. A country that has constant resource income but sees an increase in
manufacturing will record a decreasing level of natural resource dependence.
Hypothesizing that decreasing natural resource levels will lead to higher levels of
manufacturing could then be vacuously true, as it can be said to be caused by
anomalies in the data. In table 3, I run an iteration of the regressions excluding the
dummy variables indicating whether or not natural resources are increasing or
decreasing in significance. The variable for average resources draws data from the 30
year period and measures reliance on natural resources with relatively low correlation to
other fluctuations in the economy.
!

In table 3, I run regressions to predict changes in the size of the service and

manufacturing sectors. Because of suspected endogeneity in the resource dummies, I

40

run a pair of regressions with and without these variables. The dummies are not
significant and do little to alter the results of the equation.

Table 3.
#
#
MAN!1
(Intercept) # 18.39*** #
# #
(1.23) #
RESAVG
-0.08
(0.06)
AIDAVG
-0.29*
(0.12)
GDP2010
0.00*
(0.00)
AINCR
-3.04
(2.30)
ADECR
-3.17
(1.71)
RDECR
##
#
RINCR

MAN 2!
SERV 2
17.91***#
6.32***
(1.24)
(3.56)
0.05
-1.29***
(0.10) #
(0.27)
-0.33**
0.04
(0.12)
(0.32)
0.00*
0.00
(0.00)
# (0.00)
-2.11
6.02
(2.34)
(6.48)
-2.67
-2.41
(1.70)
(4.85)
-6.91#
14.86
(3.97)
(11.18)
-0.31
0.67
(1.81)
(5.06)
__________________________________________________
R$^2$
0.35
0.42
0.39
0.44
Adj. R^2
0.31
0.37
0.33
0.37
Num. obs.
81
67
81
67
#

SERV 1
15.64*** #
(3.48) #
-1.05***
(0.16)
-0.02
(0.31)
0.00
(0.00)
7.26
(6.45)
-2.02
(4.81)

Measuring manufacturing growth, the average level of aid is statistically

significant and negatively associated with manufacturing growth while the distinction
between increasing or decreasing levels of aid are insignificant. The coefficient of both
regressions are negative, showing that significant amounts of aid is associated with
lower manufacturing growth. Service sector growth shows the exact opposite
significance pattern, with average aid being insignificant but with substantial difference
between countries with increasing and decreasing levels of aid. Increasing aid results in
estimated service sector growth 7.26 percentage points above countries not receiving
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significant amounts of aid. Decreasing aid leads to levels of service sector growth below
the expected level of countries without significant levels of aid. This result implies that
not only is increasing aid able to accelerate a countryʼs sector growth, decreasing aid
does not contribute to service growth. In essence, these figures if accurate indicate that
service sector growth created by foreign aid income are not stable, and that the service
sector is continually dependent on circulating foreign aid income to support an artificially
elevated level of domestic service production. When foreign aid decreases, some of
these services are no longer economically feasible.
#

These results lend cautious credibility to the theory that windfall income supports

service sector growth while discouraging manufacturing sector growth. Stronger
evidence can surprisingly be found linking aid to sector shifts, yet in previous works it
has been the relationship between resource wealth and manufacturing failures that has
received so much scholarly attention. Unfortunately, these results also leave me unable
to quantifiably compare the natural resource curse and the curse of foreign aid. What I
do have is empirical results that weakly show that foreign aid is associated with growth
in the service sector while repressing growth in the manufacturing sector. Given the
overall quality of the data used, the chaotic nature of the data set, the possibility of
reverse causality and the relatively inconclusive results found, this analysis cannot be
considered conclusive proof or denial of even a true correlation between aid or oil and
sector growth, let alone a windfall income effect on the composition of an economy.
Future research should attempt to strengthen these findings and look closer at the
effects of foreign aid and natural resources on sector growth over time. Better data and
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more stringent empirical analysis could tease out additional answers and strengthen our
understanding of how the curse of windfall income functions.

Conclusion
#

Many economies in todayʼs world are heavily dependent on either inflows of

foreign aid or natural resource income. While on the surface such inflows of windfall
capital would conceivably help a struggling nation develop, the age-old adage ʻGive a
man a fish and he will eat for a day; teach and man to fish and he will eat foreverʼ holds.
Economies that are reliant on unearned windfall income are constrained from achieving
growth.
#

Windfall capital can have negative effects through both political and economic

mechanisms. Politically, windfall income distorts political incentives and can cause the
deterioration of democratic institutions. In other cases, windfall income can destabilize
nations and increase the chance of civil wars. While the severity of these effects is
heavily dependent on pre-existing institutions, they can have serious negative effects on
the quality of governance. Poor governance has the ability to constrain economic
growth.
#

While political effects are substantial, it is economic mechanisms that provide the

negative externality capable of explaining the ubiquitous failures of both aid and
resources to create growth. Both aid inflows and resource income induce Dutch
Disease in economies. Excess capital artificially elevates the value of a countryʼs
currency and overvaluation makes export sectors less competitive and destroys
manufacturing jobs. Dutch Disease narrows the scope of an economy and makes the
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economy even more dependent on the the supply of windfall income. Empirical results
offer limited support for this hypothesis, finding that average levels of aid are significant
in determining manufacturing sector growth and that movement in the levels of foreign
aid receives significantly impacts the growth of the service sector. While the results are
too weak to be considered conclusive, they do lend some credibility to the theory of a
windfall income curse.
#

In looking at remedies for Dutch Disease and other harmful side-effects of foreign

aid and natural resource dependence, researchers should note that both diseases stem
from the same root cause- reliance on windfall income. The curse of windfall income
incorporates both the resource curse and the curse of aid.
#

This analysis leaves interesting questions regarding how best to manage an

economy that is dependent on windfall income. Many countries caught in traps of
windfall income dependence could see substantial benefits if they were able to institute
reforms that could alleviate the effects of Dutch Disease.
#

First, the theory eliminates the feasibility of a ʻbig pushʼ solution such as

proposed by Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs calls for a large increase in aid to create conditions
where recipients reach a critical point at which consumption is satiated and is used for
investment. Sachsʼ concept, which William Easterly also criticizes, would likely have the
effect of destroying manufacturing jobs in recipient countries and making the country
more dependent on future aid without actually contributing towards growth.43
!

Many previous efforts have been made to counter the resource curse with

monetary policy that depreciates the value of a currency and maintains the
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Sachs, Common Wealth, 2008
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competitiveness of non-resource sector products at home and abroad. Good
governance and fiscal responsibility by the government is needed to accomplish this
goal. Even when good governance is present, monetary policy can still fail to make the
manufacturing industry profitable. Resource-rich countries have aimed to use their vast
oil revenues to finance diversified investments and to kickstart industrial development.
Venezuelans referred to this “sowing the seeds of oil revenues.” In Venezuela, policies
had little effect, and the government ended up effectively buying unproductive
companies to keep them from going out of business. While economies can try to reform
to avoid Dutch Disease, very few have been successful. Countries should consider
either cutting back on resource dependence or focusing efforts on investing in goods
that take high levels of capital to complete, such as research and development projects.
#

Aid dependent economies have a more straightforward verdict. Donors should

focus on aid that will not contribute to Dutch Disease. Aid flows that will not induce a
Dutch Disease mechanism include projects that employ factors of production that are
not in scarce supply, such as unskilled labor. Another innocuous aid flow exists in capital
goods, which can provide incentives for investment in economies but will not destroy
competitiveness. Because they do not induce domestic fiscal expansions, they will not
cause prices to be bid up and the currency exchange rate will not appreciate.44
#

For countries that are highly dependent on windfall income, kicking dependency is

likely to be a costly and unpredictable process. For many aid-dependent countries,
donors slowly pull back funding to encourage countries to become independent.
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Berg et al (2005)
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However, as foreign aid inflows often have the effect of making countries more
dependent, not less, on aid, this could have jarring effects.
#

In the future, as technology shocks either lower global demand for oil or when oil

reserves begin to run out, expect to see high levels of turbulence in oil economies. The
economy will be forced to quickly transition from being completely reliant on aid to
suddenly having to develop legitimate non-resource export sectors. As it stands, such
shocks would cripple a stateʼs service sector, which is usually heavily reliant on oil
wealth to pay wages. Countries should implement policies to try to at least marginally
diversify the economy and create viable production outside of the resource sector to
mitigate potentially disastrous consequences in the future.
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Apendix
Table 4.
Variable

Description

Agriculture

Livestock and crop production, as well as forestry, fishing, and hunting.

Manufacturing

A subset of the industrial sector, manufacturing encompasses all exportable
goods that a country produces.

Services

Value added in wholesale and retail trade, transport, government, financial,
professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real
estate services, imputed bank service charges, and import duties

Natural Resources

Value added by all oil, natural gas, mineral, coal, and forestry rents. Excludes
mining.

Aid/GNI

Total aid dollars from all sources over Gross Natural Income

Average Aid

The total amount of aid the country received from 1980 to 2010, over the total
GNI from the same period (weighted by annual GNI)

Aid Increase

A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of aid (Average Aid > 3%,
with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations less than the average of the
2000-2010 observations.

Aid Decrease

A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of aid (Average Aid > 3%,
with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations higher than the average of the
2000-2010 observations.

Average Resources

The total amount of natural resources the economy produced from 1980 to
2010, over the total GDP from the same period.

Resource Increase

A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of resource (Average
Resource > 10%, with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations less than the
average of the 2000-2010 observations.

Resource Decrease

A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of resource (Average
Resource > 10%, with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations greater than
the average of the 2000-2010 observations.

GDP

Country GDP

Manufacturing
Growth

The percent portion of the manufacturing sector of an economy in 2010 less
the percentage share in 1980. When measured in conjuncture with Natural
Resources, the change of the share of the economy excluding Natural
Resources is used in order to avoid direct endogeneity.

Services Growth

The percent portion of the service sector of an economy in 2010 less the
percentage share in 1980. When measured in conjuncture with Natural
Resources, the change of the share of the economy excluding Natural
Resources is used in order to avoid direct endogeneity.

** All data from the World Data Bank
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Table 5. Aid Dependent Countries, 1980-2010
Country

Avg. Aid Increase

Country

Avg. Aid

Increase

Liberia

40.11

1

Togo

9.71

0

Guinea-Bissau

31.68

0

Guinea

9.37

1

Mozambique

24.45

1

Kyrgyz Republic

9.02

0

Burundi

22.38

1

Lesotho

8.97

0

Malawi

21.16

1

Dominica

8.58

0

Sierra Leone

20.91

1

Papua New Guinea

8.06

0

Cape Verde

20.64

0

Congo, Rep.

8.04

1

Kiribati

19.45

0

Ghana

7.68

1

Rwanda

18.36

1

Jordan

7.59

0

Vanuatu

17.59

0

Nepal

7.46

0

Mauritania

16.31

0

Tajikistan

7.27

0

Comoros

15.64

0

Bolivia

6.95

0

Zambia

15.49

1

Honduras

6.70

0

Mali

15.13

0

Mongolia

6.13

1

Tanzania

14.43

1

Kenya

5.80

0

Tonga

14.31

0

Armenia

5.59

0

Niger

14.01

0

Georgia

5.36

0

Guyana

13.91

0

Zimbabwe

5.24

1

Burkina Faso

13.39

0

Sudan

5.01

0

Bhutan

13.07

0

Albania

4.84

1

Central African Republic

12.31

0

Cote d'Ivoire

4.77

0

Congo, Dem. Rep.

12.25

1

Cameroon

4.49

0

Uganda

12.23

1

Suriname

4.32

0

Lao PDR

11.10

1

Vietnam

3.75

1

Ethiopia

10.96

1

Sri Lanka

3.57

0

Madagascar

10.82

1

Belize

3.35

0

Benin

10.29

0

Bangladesh

3.19

0

Senegal

10.19

0

Macedonia, FYR

3.11

0

Chad

10.05

0

Namibia

3.06

1
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Table 6. Resource Dependent Countries, 1980-2010
Country

Res/GDP

Increase

Country

Congo, Rep.

55.0

0

Bhutan

15.8

1

Angola

47.1

0

Bolivia

15.1

1

Azerbaijan

46.5

0

Egypt, Arab Rep.

14.6

1

Saudi Arabia

44.4

1

Guinea

13.9

0

Gabon

42.4

0

Malaysia

13.8

1

Papua New Guinea

33.6

0

Mongolia

12.7

1

Venezuela, RB

29.7

1

Chile

12.2

1

Yemen, Rep.

29.6

0

Zambia

11.7

1

Iran, Islamic Rep.

29.3

0

Sudan

11.5

1

Chad

24.6

0

Guyana

11.0

1

Algeria

23.8

0

Indonesia

11.0

1

Syrian Arab Republic

21.6

0

Cameroon

10.8

1

Liberia

19.3

1

Vietnam

10.5

1

Mauritania

19.1

1

Burundi

10.0

1

Congo, Dem. Rep.

15.8

0
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RES/GDP Increase

Figure 3.

**Chart identical to Figure 3 displaying data points as country codes for country identification.
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Figure 4.
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** These charts illustrate sector movement across time (sectors normalized to add to 100%). Egypt and
Indonesia both have solid manufacturing growth. Uganda has marginal manufacturing growth, but large
service sector growth. Rwandaʼs growth is almost all attributed to services, what tiny portion of
manufactures it did have has shrunk. Norway is a fully developed economy with a large service sector
and significant resource levels.
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